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In order to assess to the degree to which the provision of economic incentives can 
result in justified inequalities, we need to distinguish between compensatory 
incentive payments and non-compensatory incentive payments. From a liberal 
egalitarian perspective, economic inequalities traceable to the provision of 
compensatory incentive payments are generally justifiable. However, economic 
inequalities created by the provision of non-compensatory incentive payments are 
more problematic. I argue that in non-ideal circumstances justice may permit and 
even require the provision of non-compensatory incentives despite the fact that 
those who receive non-compensatory payments are not entitled to them. In some 
circumstances, justice may require us to accede to unreasonable demands for 
incentive payments by hard bargainers. This leads to a kind of paradox: from a 
systemic point of view, non-compensatory incentive payments can be justified even 
though those who receive them have no just claim to them. 
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In this brief discussion, I consider whether economic inequalities can be justified on 
incentive grounds. More precisely, I examine the conditions under which a just 
economic system can provide individuals with economic inducements to engage in 
socially valuable labour when the provision of such inducements creates significant 
economic inequalities. We can call this the incentive problem. I address the 
incentive problem within the framework of principles of liberal equality. 
 
Contemporary liberal egalitarians agree that some economic inequalities can be 
justified. Rawls, for instance, argues that economic inequalities are justifiable if such 
inequalities work to the benefit of the least-advantaged. Dworkin argues that 
differences in income arising from responsible choices of individuals can be 
justifiable providing certain background conditions obtain. Without expressly 
endorsing the details of either of these positions, I offer the following construal of 
liberal equality. It is, I think, in line with the animating spirit of contemporary liberal 
conceptions of justice. Liberal egalitarianism is committed to the creation of political 
and economic institutions which eliminate or at least reasonably mitigate the 
influence of morally suspect factors on distribution of the benefits and burdens of 
social cooperation while respecting individuals as equal persons who can assume 
responsibility for the choices they make about how to conduct their lives. The 
justification of economic inequalities depends on the satisfaction of three general 
conditions. First, the existence of economic inequalities must be compatible with 
ensuring the basic dignity of human beings. Second, insofar as possible, economic 
inequalities should not be directly grounded in traits of persons or features of their 
circumstances for which they cannot claim credit. Avoidable inequalities that track 
morally arbitrary features of persons or their circumstances are presumptively 
unjust. Thus a just distribution of economic resources should not confer advantages 
or disadvantages on persons in virtue of considerations of race, sex, religion, family 
background or disability. Socially valuable natural talent is also often viewed as a 
morally arbitrary factor. Highly talented individuals should not, in virtue of their 
fortuitous natural endowment, have access to better life prospects or a greater share 
of resources than those with less valuable talents. Economic remuneration should 
not track natural talent per se. But not all sources of inequality are arbitrary. Access 
to economic resources can be legitimately influenced by production, consumption, 
leisure, effort and risk-taking choices made by responsible individuals.1 Third, 
insofar as there are factors in virtue of which inequalities can be justified, there 
should be proportionality between the factor that creates an inequality and the size 
of the inequality it generates. For instance, although differences in individual choices 
can justify economic inequalities, the magnitude of the inequalities generated via 
differences in individual choices should be roughly commensurate with reasonable 
assessments of the relative significance of different choices. For example, although 
                                            
1 Other factors, such as the demandingness, unpleasantness, dullness or dangerousness of 
employment, may also legitimately influence remuneration. 
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we may reasonably hold that, other things equal, a person who chooses to work 
50% longer than another is entitled to a higher income, it would be unfair to pay the 
harder worker a salary 5 times greater than the other worker. In other words, the 
choice-benefit function governing fair remuneration should be reasonable in various 
ways. It should, for instance, be sensitive to more than merely procedural standards 
of fairness.2 
 
Together these considerations provide an abstract account of fair economic 
remuneration or compensation. In sum, economic inequalities can be justifiable if 
they are: (a) compatible with human dignity (b) generated via suitably non-arbitrary 
factors and (c) suitably proportional to the non-arbitrary factors which legitimize 
them. 
 
 INCENTIVES, JUSTICE, AND THE OBJECTIVES OF SOCIAL COOPERATION 
 
An incentive is some kind of inducement aimed at motivating an actor or a set of 
actors to act in a particular way deemed valuable by another actor or set of actors. 
Incentives can be distinguished from deterrents. A deterrent is a socially imposed 
negative consequence that attaches to actions deemed harmful or undesirable by 
some part of society. Deterrents aim at discouraging conduct whereas incentives 
aim at encouraging conduct.3 The inducements that can constitute an incentive are 
diverse. They include a wide array of personal benefits – e.g., income, prestige, 
affection, and pleasure –  as well as inducements grounded in impersonal values – 
e.g., aesthetic, moral or political ideals. Deterrents are similarly diverse in character 
ranging from criminal punishment and fines to various forms of social 
disapprobation. Incentives grounded in impersonal values and parallel kinds of 
deterrents play an important and underappreciated role in motivating and regulating 
human behaviour. Individuals can, in the name of honouring ideals, be induced to 
make enormous social contributions that entail huge sacrifices on their part. 
Nonetheless, I shall limit my discussion here to more familiar material incentives 
such as personal welfare benefits linked with increased income and expressly 
punitive deterrents entailed by coercively enforced laws. 
 
There are countless ways in which schemes of human cooperation can be arranged 
and each way of organizing social cooperation will provide a general set of 
incentives and deterrents that shape the objectives that are pursued via cooperation 
and the manner in which the objectives are pursued. A broadly free market economy 
                                            
2  Some risk-taking choices available in market settings are fair gambles in the sense that the terms of 
the gamble are available to all on the same basis. However, the outcome of a fair gamble in a market 
setting need not be fair. A procedurally fair gamble that persons enter into freely can generate unfair 
outcomes if the relation between the choice to take the gamble and the possible loss or gain is itself 
unreasonable.  
3 In practice, the distinction between an incentive and deterrent may not be neat. Arguably one way of 
encouraging ‘good’ behaviour is by sanctioning ‘bad’ behaviour. 
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with a coercively enforced set of private rights provides a familiar framework of 
social cooperation that embodies a complex but malleable set of incentives and 
deterrents. The goods produced via market interaction and the manner in which they 
are distributed will be determined by a host of complex factors including the initial 
allocation of material resources, the distribution of natural talents amongst the 
population, the scope and character of legal regulation of economic matters 
including the tax system, the kind of educational opportunities that are available to 
facilitate the development of talents, and the preferences of economic actors. For 
any given configuration of the market, we can ask how satisfactory it is from the 
point of view of justice and whether there is a feasible alternative to it that is 
preferable. 
 
The incentive problem arises in the context of regulating4 the terms of market 
interaction in a way that: (a) respects the basic rights and entitlements of persons 
and (b) effectively facilitates the achievement of valuable social objectives. The 
goals that can be pursued are diverse and differ in normative significance, but a 
rough threefold distinction between kinds of objectives may prove helpful. First, 
some objectives of social cooperation are linked to the meeting of basic human 
needs that are integral to human dignity. It is particularly important that social 
cooperation be organized so as to provide persons with the prerequisites of security 
including access to adequate food, shelter, and basic health care. Call these ‘dignity 
objectives’. Second, there are ‘autonomy objectives’. Social cooperation can be 
organized so as to facilitate the development of autonomy but also in a way that 
creates opportunities for persons to express autonomy in meaningful and valuable 
ways. The creation of a diverse and vibrant culture is an autonomy objective. Third, 
there are ‘welfare objectives’. We may organize social cooperation in ways that 
enhance genuine but not crucial aspects of human welfare – e.g., through the 
establishment of an economic system that produces a wide variety of consumer 
goods. 
 
 Considerations of justice play at least three roles in relation to pursuit of different 
social objectives. First, there are standards of justice that bear upon assessment of 
possible goals of social cooperation. Some goals, such as the production of 
sufficient resources to meet basic needs, are themselves requirements of justice. 
Justice prohibits other possible goals, such as the creation of a market of child 
prostitution. And some goals are compatible with justice but not required by justice. 
Increasing production of luxury consumer goods may be a permissible and even 
desirable objective of a democratic society but it is not a requirement of justice. 
Second, considerations of justice play a role in determining the means through 
which (permissible) social goals may be pursued. For instance, an economically 
efficient system for the production of consumer goods may be impermissible if it 
depends on exploitative labour practices. Third, considerations of justice play a role 
                                            
4 Regulation may include schemes of redistributive taxation, direct state control over the provision of 
some goods such as education and health care, as well various other policy devices such as labour 
legislation, subsidy programs etc. that affect market interaction. 
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in determining how the permissible benefits and burdens of social cooperation 
should be distributed. 
 
THE INCENTIVE PROBLEM IN IDEAL AND NON-IDEAL SETTINGS 
 
In principle, there need be no tension between liberal equality and a suitably 
sophisticated system of incentives and deterrents. We can imagine an economy with 
a tax and regulatory regime that provides the conditions of human dignity, facilitates 
meaningful autonomy, promotes welfare and distributes the benefits and burdens of 
cooperation in a way commensurate with liberal egalitarian distributive principles. 
This is a coherent ideal. In practice, however, things are more complex for a number 
of reasons. First, there are deep practical epistemic obstacles to determining how 
the complex mix of choice and endowment that displays itself in economic settings 
should affect rates of fair compensation for economic activity. For instance, some 
portion of the income that highly talented individuals can obtain in a market 
economy reflects choices they have made about producing goods and services 
valued by others. Yet the fact that they are in a position to make such choices is 
partly the result of arbitrary factors for which they can claim no credit and in virtue of 
which they are not entitled to extra income. But how can we reliably distinguish and 
track the significance of choice and endowment in a way that allows us to identify 
what fair compensation consists in? The best we can hope for are approximate 
standards of fair compensation that are broadly faithful to liberal egalitarian 
distributive norms.5 Second, and perhaps more importantly, variations in the 
bargaining dispositions of agents can lead to tensions between different dimensions 
of egalitarian justice that raise the incentive problem in an acute way. To set the 
stage for consideration of this problem, let me articulate a few background 
conditions that give shape to the incentive problem for the liberal egalitarian. 
 
First, let us assume we have a satisfactory solution to the epistemic problem. We 
have, in other words, a practical account of fair compensation that is faithful to 
liberal egalitarian distributive norms. Second, assume that we can identify various 
social objectives we hope to achieve via social cooperation and that we know how to 
configure economic policy in a way that is compatible with the realization of these 
objectives. To illustrate these two assumptions, imagine that a government wishes 
to provide basic medical services to remote regions and that we have identified what 
fair compensation for doctors working in remote areas consists in. Salary bonuses 
will provide an incentive for doctors to relocate. Third, assume that the economy 
operates within the constraints of a principle of occupational liberty according to 
which individuals are permitted to decide, from the range of available opportunities 
for which they have the requisite skills, which occupations to pursue and which 
                                            
5 The relevant criteria may be influenced by market forces but they cannot wholly be determined by 
them. 
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employment offers to accept.6 Finally, assume that individuals in the economy have 
different bargaining dispositions. Some are what might be called ‘fair bargainers’. 
They are disposed to accept remuneration that provides fair compensation for the 
services they are in a position to render. Others are ‘hard bargainers’. They are 
disposed to wield their bargaining power to extract the highest income they can 
obtain even where this grossly exceeds fair compensation. 
 
If only fair bargainers were present in the economy, the provision of inequality-
generating incentives would not be problematic. This is because economic 
inducements to perform socially valuable services would be in line with reasonable 
standards of fair compensation. Incentive payments would, in other words, be 
compensatory. In our example, salary bonuses would appropriately compensate 
doctors for working in demanding conditions. Such incentive payments create 
economic inequality but, provided the extra salary constitutes fair compensation and 
provided the payments will induce a sufficient number of doctors to relocate, the 
inequality does not offend egalitarian norms and it will succeed in advancing the 
valued social objective. Since fair bargainers are disposed to accept fair 
remuneration, justice and inequality-creating incentives are in harmony. In this 
rather idealized setting, there is a straightforward response to the incentive problem. 
Compensatory incentive payments which generate economic inequality are 
compatible with liberal egalitarianism. 
 
Of course, the foregoing response to the incentive problem rests on optimistic 
assumptions. The trickier and more realistic version of the incentive problem 
concerns the provision of incentive payments to hard bargainers. The principle of 
occupational liberty gives talented hard bargainers leverage which they can wield to 
extract remuneration that exceeds fair compensation. Consider how the presence of 
hard bargainers changes the dynamics of the foregoing case. Suppose that doctors 
refuse to relocate to remote areas unless they are given salaries that greatly exceed 
fair compensation. Given the principle of occupational liberty, the government 
cannot compel doctors to provide the needed services for a fair salary. In this case, 
an incentive payment large enough to secure the services of the doctors will 
generate an unjust inequality. 
 
There is consequently a strong prima facie case against the provision of non-
compensatory incentive payments – i.e., payments that induce agents to provide 
valued services but which exceed fair compensation for those services. 
Nonetheless, in many circumstances, the failure to provide non-compensatory 
incentive payments will frustrate the realization of valuable social goals. Some of 
these goals may be sufficiently important to override the presumption against the 
                                            
6 Non-liberals might reject the principle of occupational liberty and might maintain that 
persons can be compelled by the state to perform socially valuable labour. But aside from 
the questionable efficacy of such coercion, liberals can object that, outside of times of 
extreme crisis, denial of occupational liberty is inconsistent with respect for the autonomy of 
persons.  
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provision of non-compensatory incentive payments. For instance, the achievement 
of social goals which are themselves basic requirements of justice can justify the 
provision of non-compensatory incentive payments. If the only feasible way of 
ensuring that individuals have the basic goods that are integral to dignity is through 
the provision of non-compensatory incentive payments, then such payments are 
justified. Somewhat paradoxically, those who receive such payments are not entitled 
to them even though justice requires that they receive them. There is also a good 
but somewhat weaker case for the provision of non-compensatory incentive 
payments in the pursuit of important autonomy objectives. The normative 
significance, from the point of view of justice, of facilitating meaningful autonomy is 
arguably sufficient to mitigate the unjust inequality created by non-compensatory 
incentives. However, the use of non-compensatory incentives in the pursuit of 
welfare goods that are compatible with but not required by justice seems more 
difficult to reconcile with liberal egalitarianism. In general, the less important the 
good is from the point of justice, the less reason there is to provide non-
compensatory incentive payments in order to secure it. Whereas justice requires us 
to provide non-compensatory incentives if doing so is necessary to the provision of 
basic health care, such payments are not required and may not even be permissible 





In order to assess to the degree to which the provision of economic incentives can 
result in justified inequalities, we need to distinguish between compensatory 
incentive payments and non-compensatory incentive payments. From the point of 
view of egalitarian justice, economic inequalities traceable to the provision of 
compensatory incentive payments are generally justifiable. However, economic 
inequalities created by the provision of non-compensatory incentive payments are 
more problematic. I have suggested that in non-ideal circumstances justice may 
permit and even require the provision of non-compensatory incentives despite the 
fact that those who receive non-compensatory payments are not, from the point of 
view of justice, entitled to them. In some circumstances, justice may require us to 
accede to unreasonable and unfair demands for incentive payments. This leads to a 
kind of paradox: from a systemic point of view, non-compensatory incentive 
payments can be justified even though those who receive them have no just claim to 
them. 
